Abstract. The Orchestra of Treaties scenario emerges if countries share the following principles for re-building the climate regime: (1) recognize the sovereignty concerns attending energy policies; (2) build upon national interests in technology and development; (3) avoid conflicts and enhance cooperation by appropriately framing core issues; and (4) address not only short-term emission cuts but also long-term technological change.In this scenario, countries will share these principles by drawing on the hard lessons of past UNFCCC negotiations. The framing of the climate change problem as the allocation of emission quota created an adversarial style of negotiation that resulted in distrust among countries. Moreover, the negotiations have been characterized by unpredictable outcomes. Since energy policies were deemed as sovereignty concerns, countries did not want to put such issues on the agenda to avoid a potentially intrusive outcome. This negotiation style brought about shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol and may lead to a stalemate in future negotiations. The scenario captures the dynamics that emerge when multiple efforts are pursued by flexible coordination of actors motivated through diverse incentives. The emerging regime, the Orchestra of Treaties, will consist of four building blocks, of which three grow outside of UNFCCC.
If the political interests and views remain diverse across countries, the Orchestra of Treaties may be the most environmentally effective regime among the alternatives. As for the evolution over time, once the technological and political feasibility of some climate policies have been demonstrated by key developed countries, all countries will be confident enough to deepen their commitments in the wider issue area. They might eventually return to a Kyoto-type structure with full participation once confidence has been built, but this may take decades.
Concerns frequently voiced about this scenario include that the regime may impose additional negotiating burden upon developing countries, or that a departure from a Kyoto style framework may end up with losing political momentum.
Introduction
The Orchestra of Treaties scenario captures the dynamics that emerge when multiple efforts are pursued by flexibly coordinated actors that are motivated by diverse incentives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The key feature of regime under this scenario is described in Section 2. Section 3 covers how the regime may emerge, including the guiding principles of the regime, the rationale for each of the building blocks, and how the current situation could evolve toward the regime. Section 4 analyses the environmental effectiveness of the regime and presents the results of a quantitative modeling exercise.
What Will the Regime Look Like?
The regime in this scenario consists of four building blocks. Three blocks grow outside the UNFCCC, including a Group of Emissions Markets (GEM), a Zero Emission Technology Treaty (ZETT), and a Climate-wise Development Treaty (CDT). The other block includes protocols for emissions monitoring and information exchange, along with targeted funding mechanisms, all of which grow within the UNFCCC. An overview is given in Box I. prices happened to differ significantly across countries, negotiators would try to level the price. For example, if Japanese price was $30 and European price was $15, European authorities would intervene in the EU market by reducing the quota for the next allocation or by purchasing emission quota from the current market. Another possible collective intervention would be to bring the global price level up or down. If the price collapsed to $2 globally, for instance, then countries would agree to coordinated intervention in the market. Note that total quotas in each country would not be the primary targets of negotiation in this scheme. This negotiation of prices and intervention mechanisms would resemble the currency management systems of the Group of Eight (G8).
This system would facilitate implementation of low-cost options such as energy conservation and fuel switching to natural gas. The price range would be kept within a reasonable scope (i.e. a relatively low price) in order to encourage short-term emission cuts they do without raising serious competitiveness concerns. The price would not be so high as $30, and also not so low as $2. Once domestic emission trading systems were in place, a price collapse would not be likely to occur since authorities would be mandated to correctly manage the markets. A precedent can be seen in the SO x emission market in the US where the regulatory authority has kept prices within a reasonable range.
If price is the main target of coordination, diverse views on design details for markets can be accommodated. Differences might exist, for instance, in market features including target emission gases and sources, use of sinks, allocation methodologies, use of baseline-and-credit system, use of carbon procurement instead of a cap-and-trade system, and so forth. The system may be fine-tuned once countries build up confidence in managing their domestic emission markets.
ZERO-EMISSION TECHNOLOGY TREATY (ZETT)
Although emission trading systems may help to reduce emissions in the short term, long-term technological change is indispensable to ultimately prevent climate change. For that purpose, an agreement that directly aims at such long-term change may emerge. The ZETT, the second building block in the Orchestra scenario, is one such option.
In the technology treaty postulated in this scenario, the ZETT, countries commit to zero emissions from energy-related CO 2 as the ultimate goal. This principle would set the right direction for the policy makers and the right expectations for stakeholders for long-term technological change in the energy sector. The goal will not be easily achievable, but the treaty would create constant pressure for progress toward the goal. The principle embodied in the concept 'zero emissions' is simple enough to be a workable concept for decades to come.
The treaty would not stop at the level of principle. Since a binding regime for technology policy is too intrusive for countries to agree upon immediately, it is likely to start with a non-binding pledge-and-review system. In the system, countries would identify emission sources, describe how to address the emission reduction in the long run, and state why emissions cannot be reduced immediately. Commitments from the countries would typically include funding for basic research and development, creating niche markets for nascent technologies, and demonstration and diffusion programs. These commitments would be tabled by country and by sector (See Table I below).
The ZETT bears some resemblance to the WTO. The WTO uses commitment tables -with many reservations -as vehicles and is governed by simple principles workable for decades such as free trade and non-discrimination (known as Most Favored Nations and National Treatment in WTO jargon). 2 Encouraged by the legitimization of the ZETT, countries would develop technologies in national, bilateral or regional settings by building upon where their national interests lie. Such sub-global treaties exist already. For example, the International Energy Agency (IEA 2002) has been leading Implementation Agreements, and the US is already leading the carbon capture technology through the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. The EU is leading the renewable energy by Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition. Japan could lead a solar photovoltaic (PV) or an energy conservation technologies, areas in which she bears national interests for energy security reasons, and she may multiply the cost-effectiveness of R&D activities by enhancing international cooperation. 3 
Regional climate technology treaties under ZETT
The most serious endeavors concerning technological development have been, and will be, a regional or like-minded base rather than global base because the resource endowments and political supports differ across regions. The EU, with rich window resources, have secured the strong support on renewable energy promotion policy and successfully increased wind-power capacity recently. The US, Australia, and Norway, with rich and cheep fossil fuel resources and a geological structure favorable to carbon storage, have been leading the geological storage technology. Sooner or later they will need the technology if they want to continue to raise the revenue from the fossil fuel production up to their full reserve under pressure of the environmental group to deal with carbon emissions. Japan, without any energy resources and high energy costs in general, has developed the most energy-efficient economy with strong energy conservation policy already. China, without sufficient oil resources and being plagued by the inefficient energy system inherited from socialism economy, has also given high priority in energy conservation on her policy agenda. Sharing the same concerns on energy security and economic efficiency, there has been bilateral cooperation between the two countries, and there is a good chance that they can further enhance the cooperation on the common agenda.
All these activities can secure political support at regional and national levels. These activities are not on a global scale, but the sub-global level activities seem sufficient to overcome the most important barrier -to bring the costs of nascent technology down. In all three technology activities, significant costs reduction have been observed or anticipated. 4 A lesson learnt during the Kyoto process is that the climate issue should be imbedded in development policy. Development is the primary concern of developing countries and there are many potential areas in which climate issues can be imbedded in development policy. Conversely, allowing policy regarding 'mainstream' development issues, such as energy access by poor people and development of water management system, to be set alone and creating climate policy independently from it does not make good policy sense.
CLIMATE-WISE DEVELOPMENT TREATY (CDT)
Such perceptions may lead to the creation of the third building block in this scenario, the CDT. The agreement would be reached by several like-minded developed and developing countries to modify the flows of financial assistance so that it imbeds climate issues into development policy. Climate issues include technology transfer, adaptation and mitigation.
The core principle of the CDT would be to build upon what experts call the development-first approach, and would not compromise development goals. The CDT would seek to make development more sustainable by addressing climate issues. Under this principle, the activities of international assistance agencies and official development aid (ODA) would be revised, and would redirect billions of dollars annually to assist climate-wise development.
Projects supported under the CDT would include, for example, basin-wide watersystem management projects, which would address development concerns such as access to water, sanitation and hydroelectric power generation. At the same time it would assist in adaptation to climate change through better protection against extreme rainfalls. Hydropower, of course, would contribute to creating less-carbonintensive energy systems.
Another example would be energy-conservation projects in rural areas. These would address development concerns by reducing air pollution (both indoors and outdoors) and preventing deforestation due to wood fuel use. Protected forests would reduce vulnerability to extreme climate changes, and emissions of CO 2 and other GHGs would be cut by energy conservation.
UNFCCC AND ITS PROTOCOLS -THE FACILITATIVE CONDUCTOR OF THE ORCHESTRA
The fourth building block in the Orchestra scenario is the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC plays an important role as a focal point and as the forum to address issues on which all countries can cooperate effectively. UNFCCC is the conductor of the Orchestra scenario, but it facilitates cooperation among the players, and not forcefully commanding the players to obey.
In this scenario, the Information Exchange Protocol (or its equivalent development under the UNFCCC) serves to take stock of the progress under each treaty so that countries' efforts are fully recognized and accounted for. Periodic meetings of ministers will keep the climate change issue politically salient. The Emission Monitoring Protocol (or its equivalent development under the UNFCCC) serves to monitor how GHG emissions are controlled. Funding for the least-developed countries and for the adaptation of small-island countries will remain as important issues to be addressed, building upon what was agreed in the Marrakech Accord. These agreements will be direct extensions of existing systems under the UNFCCC. For example, Articles 5, 7 and 8 of Kyoto Protocol and the National Communications will serve as major vehicles for information exchange and monitoring.
How and Why the Regime May Emerge: Principles, Rationale and Evolution
The Orchestra regime would emerge if countries share the following four principles as the hard lessons of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol negotiations (Section 3.1). These principles will provide the rationale for each treaty in the Orchestra scenario (Sections 3.2 through 3.6). Evolution of the regime over time will also be described (Section 3.7).
PRINCIPLES -OR THE HARD LESSONS OF THE UNFCCC/KP NEGOTIATIONS
In this scenario, the countries share the following views. The UNFCCC/KP system is not without its shortcomings. Often quoted are the lack of participation by the US and developing countries, the hot-air of Russia and the Ukraine, short-sightedness, and the dubious accounting system for carbon sinks. These shortcomings are not likely to disappear easily if countries continue the current style of negotiation because there are structural problems. In order to modify the system to remedy these drawbacks, this scenario assumes that countries think that the following principles will be important.
3.1.1. Principle 1: Pay attention to the sovereignty concerns attending energy policies Many shortcomings arise because countries are not ready to hand control over the energy policy to a UN system which is seen as beyond national control. UNFCCC negotiations have been characterized by package deals at the end of every COP. This meant that the consequences for countries of each issue item have been unpredictable. Given this situation, countries have been reluctant from the outset to put sensitive issues on agenda.
Australia opted out of the Kyoto Protocol by raising sovereignty concerns. While the US did not apparently refer to sovereignty concerns, this seems to be the core reason for its withdrawal. Developing countries have been refusing to enter in negotiation on anything that might lead to their binding caps, least to say the binding caps themselves. Their concerns were frequently expressed in terms of needs for economic prosperity.
Another notable example is the policy and measures (PAM) provision in the Kyoto Protocol Article 2. There has been almost no progress in elaboration of this Article since COP3 in 1997, while it had been expected to function as a vehicle toward long-term technological development. Countries that did not want to see intrusive outcomes for energy policy simply refused to begin an elaboration given the unpredictability of negotiation outcomes.
In this scenario, countries think that the negotiation style will need swift change by creating different arenas for negotiation. The process should be carefully designed so that participating countries can be confident that intrusive outcomes will not be imposed on them unwillingly. There might be a chance for the UNFCCC to fulfill this role if it can successfully change its negotiation style along this line. Under this scenario, however, it is deemed more likely that such arenas will grow outside the auspices of the UNFCCC by like-minded countries in smaller groupings that increase over time to include more members.
Principle 2: Build upon National interests in technology and development
Countries spend a considerable amount of money on technological development. For example, Japan alone spends US$1.4 billion per year for research, development and demonstration programs for new energy technologies such as solar photovoltaics (PV). Occasionally countries collaborate on big projects such as fusion with annual budgets of billions of dollars. These activities are possible because they meet national interests. Most energy-related research activities have been justified for security reasons, not environmental reasons.
Likewise, countries spend considerable amounts on development assistance. Japanese ODA alone amounts to US$10 billion per year. Countries can spend such sums because it serves certain national interests such as security or facilitating exports. Against this backdrop, financial flows associated with the UNFCCC/KP, $0.5 billion for three Marrakech funds combined, plus CDM and GEF, are small. Modifying how development assistance is targeted is far more important than creating new small funds, since preventing climate change is closely related to the way countries develop.
In this scenario, countries think that it is important to build the climate regime around national interests on technology and development so that the system will be stable and so that a meaningful level of financing is mobilized in climate-wise directions.
3.1.3. Principle 3: Avoid conflicts and enhance cooperation by appropriately framing the core issues The UNFCCC/KP system builds on the concept of allocating emission constraints 5 to countries by framing climate issues as problems of global commons. This approach has had an unexpected dire consequence: the whole negotiation has become adversarial since countries have been trying to cap emissions from other countries and tighten them, while simultaneously seeking the most generous possible limits for themselves. Combined with the unpredictable nature of the package deals described in Principle 1 above, countries have tended to block negotiations at the outset. Developing countries refused any negotiations that might lead to binding caps, including mandatory reporting of their emission-reduction plans. Even if countries agreed to commence negotiations, they had a tendency to take extreme positions with safety margins, so that they could secure large enough emissions quotas to cover their worst cases. Russian secured hot air so that an emissions cap would never interfere with their economic growth (Victor 2003) . Negotiators felt that there was simply 'distrust' among countries at COP8 in New Delhi. In this scenario, the countries think that such conflicts may be avoided by framing the issues in different ways by following Principles 1 and 2 above.
Principle 4: Address not only short-term emission cuts but also long-term technological change
The emission-trading system may bring about short-term reductions, but will not create incentives for long term technological change alone. 6 Price forecasts indicate that the market price of carbon emissions will be US$5 to US$15 in the First Commitment Period 7 . Increasing the price much beyond this level would be difficult because of competitiveness concerns. Worse, if such a low price is the only price signal driving the pace of implementation of climate policy, it may undermine serious efforts aimed at promoting long-term technological change since the performance of every climate policy will be assessed in terms of the price signal. Knowing this danger, at least intuitively, countries have implemented many technology policies independent of carbon price. These range from technology-push measures such as R&D subsidies, to market-pull approaches such as Renewable Portfolio Standards.
Further enhancing such activities should be an important role for a global climate regime.
In this scenario, countries share the view that the combination of short-term emission cuts and long-term technological change is necessary to ultimately prevent climate change, and countries will recognize the need for the two levels of price signal -and global frameworks that empower policies that create the signals. One framework will aim at long-term technological change with high price signal for new technologies and small niche markets. The other will aim at promoting technological diffusion in the short term with a low price of carbon in large, national/global-scale markets.
RATIONALE FOR THE GEM
If the countries share the four principles above, the GEM may be intentionally created on a like-minded country base. Alternatively, the GEM may simply appear as an unintended consequence of the emergence of separate national and regional emission markets. In either case, it is interesting that there is potential for such a system to be a more effective alternative to the emission market created through Kyoto-style negotiations to allocate binding caps to countries. Indeed, there are several merits to the GEM.
First, the GEM is free from sovereignty concerns because each country has the final say over its quota and price of carbon. A good analogy is international monetary policy. Issuing currency is seen as a sovereign issue, and countries chose their systems of individual national currencies. Countries have never agreed to adopt a single global currency (with singular exception of the EU -implying that the countries cannot share the single emission 'currency' with singular exception of the EU).
The biggest fruit of removing sovereignty concerns would be much wider participation than in the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, the US is likely to be the core of the GEM. There is a definite possibility that the US will develop an independent emission trading system of its own outside the Kyoto Protocol. The US has been the world leader in implementing domestic emission trading systems for SO x and other pollutants, showing that the US legal system is highly compatible with emission trading systems. If the US can control quotas and prices herself, it is then possible that a law could be passed by a majority vote of the House of Representatives and the Senate. This would be a much easier political goal to attain than ratification of the Kyoto Protocol which would require a two thirds majority in the Senate.
Would the GEM entail a loss of economic efficiency, with different prices across the world, or would it engender a race to the bottom in carbon prices because of concerns about competitiveness? Probably neither of both. We can expect convergence of price levels or market coordination across independent markets since price signals would exist for all the markets. This would not be an exception but a typical case for environmental policy in different countries to be governed by independent systems. Interestingly enough, the environmental policies tend to become coordi-nated without attempting formal harmonization through treaties (Salter 1988 ). Regulations such as emission standards have converged among countries due to several factors including technological feasibility, trade and investment (Vogel 1995) , elite networking (Haas, Keohane, and Woodward 1993) and social practice (Young 2002) . For example, a race to the bottom among countries which faced different costs of emission reductions was not observed after implementation of SO x policies in Japan, Europe and the US. Likewise, once domestic carbon trading systems are in place, the authorities do not want to see prices collapse, and have vested interests in keeping prices within ranges that are deemed appropriate.
It is likely that the methods used to discipline the GEM will resemble those used for monetary and fiscal policy. Issuing emission rights (or constraints) is similar to printing money. If a country issues too much currency, inflation and depreciation occur. Likewise, if a country issues too many emission rights, the price collapses and there will be strong pressure on the authority to absorb excess emissions from the market, or issue many fewer emissions rights in the next allocation. If, for example, the US found its price to be too low compared to the EU, there would be political pressure on the authority to issue fewer emission rights in order to keep prices higher. Other countries, say Japan, may implement systems other than cap-andtrade, such as governmental procurement of carbon credits. Even in such a case the price for procurement would be set at a price level comparable with the EU and the US markets. As a natural development, a multilateral body such as the 'Carbon G8/ G20' would emerge and try to harmonize price levels within a certain range, and to gradually coordinate the details of the designs of various emission markets.
Another merit of the GEM compared to the Kyoto Protocol is that it would accommodate diverse ways of implementing market mechanisms. Imagine, for example, that the EU has its emission trading system, Japan has a carbon procurement fund with baseline and credit systems, and the US has a domestic emission market with a safety valve and project-based activities that cover a wider range of land-use projects than the CDM. All three systems would be totally different but would not undermine other markets under the GEM arrangement since emission rights would not be convertible among markets and they would be coordinated through price signals. Even if a country had an excessively lenient accounting methodology for project-based activities and the flood of credits accrued from the projects caused the price to collapse temporarily, the authority would immediately try to control the domestic price at the international level, with the consequence that the incentives for domestic activities to reduce emission would not be severely undermined. As such, a merit of coordinating price, compared to quotas, is that it does not create an incentive for countries to gaping loopholes. It does not make good sense for a country to create low-cost dubious emission reduction credits if they have to keep the price high at the international level anyway. In stark contrast, there are incentives for countries in a quota allocation regime to create whatever loophole to lessen the burden of emission cap, something which was seen as typical behavior during the negotiation in the Kyoto process.
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While some scientific uncertainty remains regarding climate change, the following conclusions are commonly agreed. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions should be cut decisively in the latter half of the 21st century to prevent detrimental climate change. A typical analysis shows that developed countries should cut emissions by 80-90% from business-as-usual cases (den Elzen 2003) . Among all greenhouse gases, CO 2 will have the largest greenhouse effects if serious emission cuts are not undertaken, and most of the CO 2 will be from the energy sector.
Anticipating that other greenhouse gases that are less controllable than CO 2 (such as methane and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture and forestry) will remain, and considering that the least-developed countries will find it difficult to cut any emissions, developed countries will have to cut energy-related emissions by 90-100% from business-as-usual in the latter half of the 21st century.
In this scenario, countries share the view as follows. To achieve emissions reductions, simply shrinking the current energy system is not the answer. Massive emissions reductions require swift technological change. On the supply side, renewables, nuclear power, and fossil fuel combustion with carbon capture technology will all be necessary. On the demand side, hydrogen and electricity will be the major energy carriers, and an efficient transmission and distribution infrastructure and end-use technologies will require to be deployed.
While the emission trading system will help to realize low-cost emission cut opportunities, this alone will not stimulate long-term technological change as argued in Principle 4 above. We need another policy instrument.
In this scenario, the countries think that the Kyoto Protocol and its continuation will not be enough to promote such long-term technological change. So far, the Kyoto Protocol has been effective in promoting some technological change. Binding targets pressured countries to implement technology policies, such as Renewable Portfolio Standards in many countries, and research and development expenditures for biomass and solar power in Japan. Ironically, this occurred because the emission markets have remained immature. As the emission markets become more liquid, the binding-target approach is likely to provide disincentives to long-term technological change. When there is a global carbon market price, all governmental policies and corporate investments will be assessed in terms of costeffectiveness in comparison to such a global price. That may kill serious investments in long-term technological change, unless there is a distinctive signal to enhance investment. Of course, the outcome could be different if long-term carbon prices are expected to be relatively high. However, keeping the carbon market price high will be very difficult, since the coverage of caps would be limited and competitiveness concerns would be raised if a country tried to increase price levels without the participation of other countries.
Then question that follows from this is: What can countries do at the global level to promote long-term technological change? A review of existing technological cooperation revealed that hitherto there has been no energy technology collaboration on a global scale (Philibert 2004 ). Most efforts have been national or among like-minded countries, and built upon national interests. Activities that took the form of cooperation among like-minded countries range from the CERN project for particle physics to the IEA's Implementation Agreements on technology research and development (R&D). Most of the technology R&D activities have been countrydriven. The Japanese government has been spending more than US$300 million per annum for solar PV alone. Such investments have been justified for several reasons, of which energy security has been the most important. This situation makes it clear that countries have national interests in technologies, and that international cooperation would be successful if it is built upon the interests.
The ZETT system will be mostly non-binding at the beginning since it is too intrusive to mandate countries to commit to specific energy policies. Still, in its initial stages, the ZETT could create signals that provide legitimacy for governments to secure budgets to implement ambitious technology policies. With the global umbrella, business stakeholders would share expectations that their R&D efforts would make profits. As countries increase their confidence in such policies, the system could evolve to become a more binding regime over the decades -the appropriate time scale for assessing such long-term institution-building efforts. It took 50 years for the WTO to reach its current status (beginning with the collapse of negotiations to create the International Trade Organization). A regime for longterm technological change to address climate change will have the same time span for two different reasons. The first reason is obvious -technological change cannot take place overnight. The countries will have to continuously apply pressure toward such a change. The second reason is that energy technology policy impinges on sovereignty, and hence, it may take time to develop deep collaboration. Fortunately, countries seem to have some time available for technological development of a new energy system, since what decisively matters to climate is not short-term emissions over a couple of decades, but long-term emissions over several decades.
The ZETT could be part of the UNFCCC process, but it is likely that many countries would feel more comfortable negotiating in a different arena, if this was to be carefully designed so as not to impose any intrusive and unpredictable consequences. The UNFCCC process has been characterized by package deals arrived at in the last minutes of COPs, hence the outcome has been unpredictable and not capable of being controlled by countries. As described in Principle 2 above, this situation has resulted in a stalemate. Countries would need more predictable and non-intrusive negotiation arenas for technological cooperation. Negotiation under the UNFCCC Article 2 could be successful in creating a system equivalent to ZETT, only if the negotiation process is swiftly reformed to become less intrusive and more predictable. Unfortunately, there has been no sign that this will occur.
RATIONALE FOR CLIMATE-WIDE DEVELOPMENT TREATY (CDT)
The architecture of the Kyoto Protocol resembles that of the Montreal Protocol for protecting stratospheric ozone, but its shortcomings are obvious now. It will fail to induce developing countries to take on binding caps counter to expectation at the outset of negotiations. Under the Montreal Protocol, developed countries took on targets first, while keeping developing countries within the regime through assistance. After a decade, developing countries also took on targets, helped by several incentives. This was possible because developing countries saw that the benefits of incentives outweighed the costs of taking on targets. In the Kyoto regime, however, the perceived costs of binding caps, which may limit economic development, are seen as dwarfing any incentives available from developed countries. Potential threats to economic development cannot be offset by GEF funds, capacity building, technology transfer, and the three funds established at Marrakech accords, even when combined.
The 'incremental costs' of reducing emissions by taking on binding caps are estimated to be in the order of 1% of GDP (IPCC 2000) . There are no developed countries ready to pay this amount to developing countries for the sake of the climate alone. Another way of paying incremental costs would be to transfer income via emission trading. However, there are double problems in doing so under the Kyoto Protocol. First, creating further excess emission quota, called 'tropical hot air', may lead to a very low price on the emission trading market. Second, and more importantly, the amount of income transfers created through such an arrangement would be too large to be accepted by developed countries. Suppose that a large developing country, like China or India, entered the Kyoto Protocol with a binding cap, induced by such an arrangement then the size of hot-air would have been of Russian scale. The income transfer could be as much as US$10 billion per annum. This would be beyond the level acceptable to the US and other developed countries, just like paying for Russian hot-air was not acceptable to the US. In this scenario, the countries share the view that they need to depart from the 'incremental costs' approach.
Alternatively, the countries in this scenario embrace a more workable concept: 'make development more sustainable ' (Munashinghe 1993) . That is, we must identify development goals first, then make achieving them more sustainable without compromising those goals. There are many ways to modify the current development strategies of developing countries. One strong leverage mechanism that developed countries can use is aid flows through international finance agencies and governmental ODAs. Under the Orchestra scenario, the CDT would modify these flows for the sake of the climate. Given the current scale of such financing, activities under the CDT could easily be far larger than the potential flow created by the Kyoto Protocol. For example, Japanese ODA alone is US$10 billion per annum, dwarfing the commitment of US$410 million per annum for the three Marrakech Accord funds combined 9 . The World Bank is a powerful organization that guides the economies of many developing countries. Compared to this financial mega-power, climate funding is a mere drop in the bucket. Climate-policy is closely related to bigger picture development. In this scenario, countries agree that imbedding the climate change issue in development policies is a prerequisite for engaging developing countries in meaningful action.
While there are divided views upon the climate policy priorities of developing countries, research activities have revealed that, despite the conceptual conflicts, many project-based activities can address all concerns in a coherent manner (UNEP/ RIVM/IIED 2003). Conceptual conflicts came to the fore at the negotiations at COP8 in New Delhi. While developed countries were interested in mitigation activities in developing countries, developing countries were more interested in technology transfer and adaptation. This sharp difference in views was seen as a formidable obstacle to progress. However, research activities revealed that these conflicts of interests at the conceptual level can be reconciled at the concrete project level. Indeed, all of the concerns can be simultaneously resolved through careful implementation of development projects. Adaptation measures mostly coincide with protection against natural disasters. Adaptation initiatives, such as infrastructure development, education, livelihood improvement, and resilience coincide with development priorities. They also enhance the enabling environment for technology transfer.
Negotiation of the CDT would provide a good opportunity for international development organizations to review and revise their activities. International development agencies are mandated to continuously assess their activities, and they have gradually been broadening their view of development from mere economic growth to sustainable development. For example, the Japanese ODA is at a crossroads and seeks the opportunity to serve its widely-defined national interests, including protecting the global environment. The legitimacy that the CDT creates could help Japan to mobilize more ODA for climate-relevant activities.
APPROPRIATE FRAMING OF ISSUES STRENGTHENS WILLINGNESS TO PAY
While the Orchestra scenario assumes that countries' willingness to pay is low for a Kyoto-type international binding-cap regime, it leaves open the possibility that they may be willing to pay costs through other modes. In this scenario, countries will explore appropriate framing of the issues so that they can maximize expenditures for mitigation.
Estimates of the costs of greenhouse gas mitigation typically range from 0.1% to 1% of GDP, depending on economic models and assumptions (IPCC 2000) . This can be deemed as small or large, depending on one's point of view. It can be considered small if one realizes that a 1% reduction means several months' delay in economic achievement. For example, if economic growth is 2% per year, a 1% reduction in GDP means the level of welfare that would have been reached in January of 2040 might not be achievable under implementation of climate policies until July of 2040.
For many, this would be an acceptable price for fending off the impacts of climate change.
The essential problem is not economic, but political and contextual. If a country has an emissions cap and 1% of GDP flows out to other countries through emission trading, such a circumstance would never be acceptable. Potential financial outflows of a billion dollars (0.02% of GDP) per year resulting from emission trading under Kyoto Protocol were thought to be problematic for Japan during the debates before the ratification. Canada also had a similar debate. In contrast, Japanese governmental R&D on renewable energy technology is US$1.4 billion annually. Japanese ODA exceeds US$10 billion annually (0.2% of GDP) and increasing them by 0.02% would not cause severe problems if such financial flows were built around national interests.
FOLLOWING PRECEDENT, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LEAD THE WAY
The final premise of this scenario is that developed countries agree to take the lead to demonstrate the feasibility of mitigation policy -to the extent that it is politically feasible. To date, all environmental problems besides climate change have been identified and managed by developed countries first. Later, developing countries followed suit, relying on technologies and policy measures that were already proven to be successful. This scenario assumes that developed countries will follow precedent and once again take unilateral actions in advance of developing countries. The anticipated awards for such early actions are presented in detail in Section 4.4.
EVOLUTION OF THE REGIME
The CDT and the ZETT could be negotiated immediately in parallel with the Kyoto process since it would not interfere with the Kyoto Protocol. Although there are some relevant clauses in the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiations have been far from successful. To create the CDT and the ZETT, to flank the Kyoto Protocol would be a sensible option. There are many potential arenas for both treaties to be negotiated. The ZETT may be built upon the sprout in the G8 ministerial declaration on sustainable development, or upon initiatives undertaken by the EU, the US or Japan. The CDT could be initiated by the G8 or the G20, by a regional system such as APEC or NAFTA, or by a national process of revising ODA priorities.
The key departure from the Kyoto regime would be the shift to the GEM. There are many pathways to ignite the process of GEM. It may begin immediately if countries do not embrace the idea of continuing the Kyoto framework. Or, it may begin if the US decides to implement its domestic emission market independently of the UN system. Or, it might begin if Russia were to reject the Kyoto Protocol, as she potentially does so at the time of writing. In either case, emission markets will be implemented in a bottom-up manner in many countries. The co-existence of several markets would naturally lead to negotiation between market administrators -with harmonization of price levels within a certain range as the key focus of negotiations.
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The GEM, the ZETT and the CDT might eventually be integrated into the UN-FCCC, but the timing of this is beyond prediction. This would occur in two cases. In the first case, major developed countries would see climate policy as their utmost priority. Once key developed countries put the issue high on the agenda, they would exert a wide array of powers to control emissions of all countries. In the second case, key developed countries would acquire confidence that they could control emissions without significantly harming their economies. Technological development would be the key in this case. The first case would require major climatic catastrophe for the climate policy to be high on the political agenda, and perhaps it would be too late to reverse the system once the catastrophe happened -it is a pathway that should be avoided. The second case is likely to come about, but it would require one or two decades. During this transition period, the Orchestra approach may be at work.
The Orchestra approach can be characterized as a temporary deviation from the UN system, since it does not rule out long-term integration under the UNFCCC. Given the low priority countries currently assign to climate change in political reality, the high uncertainties of mitigation costs, and the immaturity of technologies, it may make sense to frame response to the threat of climate change around four principles in a cooperative manner. This approach aims at putting workable systems in place. The current situation of the Kyoto Protocol is miserable, and a simple continuation of the system may be a waste of time. An alternative may be to develop the Orchestra approach for the time being, and once countries acquire confidence in their ability to control emissions and put the climate issue high on the agenda, it may then be time for the Orchestra approach to evolve into a powerful and comprehensive treaty.
Environmental Effectiveness of the Regime
One of the premise of the Orchestra approach is that it makes global and long-term sense for developed countries to take the lead in long-term technological development and short-term emission cuts, to the extent that is politically feasible for them. This section illustrates how such a premise can be justified.
The lessons from the history of pollution control suggest that followers have always learned from and done better than the leaders. For SO x emissions, for example, massive reduction measures were adopted around 1970 in Japan and around 2000 in China. It is remarkable that China did this at a per capita income level of less than US$1000, which is a tenth of Japanese per capita income in 1970 (see Figure 1) . SO x is not an exceptional case -followers have been able to control pollution at lower income levels than leaders for other pollutants as well. Developing countries appear to be able to follow environmental Kuznets curves at lower levels of per capita income than developing countries.
Demonstration of policy feasibility was the key to inducing proactive emissions cuts by developing countries at earlier stages of development. There are four indispensable components to successful demonstration:
1. Technologies. Desulfurization technologies were developed and costs were reduced. 2. Institutions. Governmental structures and legal instruments were tested in developed countries, and many turned out to be environmentally effective. 3. Ideas. The ideas, such as 'SO x must be controlled' or 'polluting companies cannot sell products once brand names are undermined' were created in developed countries and diffused worldwide. 4. Economic feasibility. After the implementation of a wide array of environmental policies, the economies of developed countries were shown to be still running without significant difficulties.
The general lessons that are applicable to climate regime is clear. First, it makes sense for developed countries to take the lead in mitigation policy. Second, such leadership should be used to demonstrate feasibility in four dimensions.
EMISSION PATH UNDER ORCHESTRA OF TREATIES
An energy modeling analysis was conducted to demonstrate how CO 2 emissions might change under the Orchestra approach. As is always the case for such modeling exercises, many simplifying assumptions were necessary, and the results should be considered as indicative rather than conveying accurate quantitative difference. Still, there are two distinct merits to this type of analysis. First, it can assess whether a particular scenario falls within a plausible range of technical parameters. Second, it articulates the concepts of the scenario and alternatives in an internally consistent manner. The analysis used the architecture of a mainstream energy model. 11 Three dynamics, which reflect the lessons of pollution control policy, are incorporated to describe the Orchestra scenario:
4.1.1. Dynamics 1: Technological learning and diffusion The costs of mitigation technologies generally decrease over time. This occurs because knowledge for production is accumulated through research, development and mass production in competitive markets. Such effects are called technological learning. 12 Once technologies become available at reasonable cost, developing countries can benefit from purchasing them without also investing in the innovation process. This is called technological diffusion. The learning and diffusion process are incorporated in the model. Developed countries are assumed to create niche markets for nascent technologies through their policy such as renewable portfolio standards, governmental subsidies and procurement. The costs of the technologies, ranging from photovoltaic power supply to hydrogen automobiles, were assumed to be reduced as the function of cumulative production. The merit of costs reduction are embraced by all countries.
Dynamics 2: Income effect on willingness to pay
In general, people tend to devote more resources to protecting environmental quality as they become richer. Environmental problems receive more attention when other basic human needs have already been met and when people can afford to pay for resolving environmental problems. Environmental economists have observed this phenomenon in studies of a variety of environmental problems. These dynamics are incorporated in the model. The willingness-to-pay to carbon reduction is assumed to increase as income rises.
Dynamics 3: Policy convergence
The strictness of environmental regulations in different countries has a tendency to converge over a couple of decades. This observation is robust across almost all environmental issues (Salter 1988; Sugiyama 2003) . Many environmental policies have not been internationally harmonized by treaties. Still, convergence was observed. Examples include automobile NO x emissions and SO x emissions from stationary sources. Typical time lags between the leaders and laggards are less than 10 years among developed countries, and 30 years between the leaders and developing countries. For example, Japan took its most decisive actions to reduce pollutants from automobiles and stationary sources around 1970. It was followed by the US and the countries of the EU within 10 years, and by China and other developing countries within 30 years. Such convergence occurred due to factors including elite networking (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993) , social practice (Young 2002) , technological feasibility, and trade (Vogel 1995) . This dynamics is incorporated in the model. The technology policy and carbon policy, which are initiated by the leading countries by the dynamics 1 and 2 above, are eventually followed by the rest of the world. The time lags are formulated as the function of income, and differ across technology type. 13 As such, once some like-minded countries create a niche market for a nascent technology and high level of carbon tax, the policies are followed suit by the rest of developed countries with the certain time lag, and then the developing countries with longer time lag.
The results of the model analysis are shown in Figure 2 for global emissions (2a), emissions from developed countries (2b), and emissions from developing countries (2c). Four cases are plotted in each. NP (No Policy) is the hypothetical no-climate policy case in which neither technology policy nor carbon pricing policy was taken by the countries. IE (Income Effect) assumes moderate carbon pricing policy but incorporates only one of three dynamics (income effect). OT (Orchestra of Treaties) assumes moderate carbon price in carbon markets and moderate incentives for technological development, and incorporates all three dynamics (technological learning, income effect, and policy convergence). WP (Weak Policy) is the same as OT, but assumes a low price of carbon market and weak incentives for technological development. Figure 2a illustrates how global emissions would be controlled in the Orchestra of Treaties case (OT) if a certain carbon price and the right incentives for technological development are set for developed countries. Once carbon price mechanisms are implemented in developed countries, similar systems would be implemented in developing countries through policy convergence dynamics (dynamics 3). Likewise, once technologies are developed in developed countries, they would diffuse to developing countries through the three dynamics described above.
Note that the key differences in emissions occur in the latter half of the 21st century in developing counties. (Note that the vertical axis differs across the three figures). The key to make this happen is to create appropriate policy incentives in developed countries in the early 21st century. Such activities would swiftly change the emissions behavior of developing countries through the three policy dynamics.
Of course, the architecture of the regime alone would not prevent climate change. The Weak Policy (WP) case illustrates that the OT approach may fail if its components are too weak.
Concluding Remarks
The scenario has been presented in several workshops worldwide, including Tokyo, Beijing, Brussels, Washington, DC Concerns frequently voiced about this scenario include that the regime may add more negotiating burden to countries, or that a departure from Kyoto style framework -the binding emission cap approach -may end up losing political momentum.
The premise of the binding cap approach, to our knowledge, is that the countries will somehow secure enough political will to meet the targets, which are supposed to get increasingly more ambitious, even if they sacrifice their own economic prosperity to some extent. In addition, the binding target approach is envisaged to continuously create the political momentum toward the full compliance, and the more ambitious targets. However, such a process will not be materialized if the political will is not enough in the first place.
In the Orchestra of Treaties scenario, the countries recognize that the political will to take binding emission caps remain diverse across countries, and they try to imbed the climate issues in the much bigger picture -the issues for which they can stably secure domestic political support. Countries can mobilize themselves if the issue is framed as new technology development, economic efficiency, or energy security, not as the capping on their economic prosperity. It is very ironic that China and Japan have been pitted against each other in the UNFCCC negotiation on the binding caps despite having given high priority to energy conservation on their domestic policy agenda. If the issue is framed as cooperation on energy conservation and regional energy security, there will be more chances for effective cooperation and real emission reductions.
The Orchestra of Treaties scenario may be characterized as a temporary deviation from the binding cap regime in seek for the more cooperative framing of the issues that can secure stable and strong political will. Once the technological and political feasibility of some climate policies have been demonstrated by developed countries, all countries will be confident enough to deepen their commitments in the wider issue area. In order to create the initial unilateral actions, the reframing of the issues from cost sharing of emission caps to benefits in technology and development at international institutional level would be of key importance. In the long run, such arrangements may go back to a Kyoto-type structure of binding caps with full participation once confidence has been built, but this would take decades.
If it succeeds, the Orchestra approach may turn out to be the most environmentally effective regime among the alternatives for the coming decade or two. Of course, the potential drawback of the approach is that it may end up diluting the political efforts to the bits and pieces, scrapping all the efforts invested in building the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. The commitments to technological R&D by some countries were often seen as a sign of reluctance to share the painful burden of emissions reduction. For anyone who embarks in the direction of the Orchestra scenario, demonstrating the strong political will to combat climate change would be the key for securing the support from the environmental constituency. Also required would be concrete and serious actions, such as regional technology activities on renewable, carbon storage, and energy conservation.
